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APPEAL TO HEAVEN:  ON THE RELIGIOUS ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF REVOLUTION
John M. Kang*
“An Appeal to Heaven.”
—Slogan appended to several American navy schooners in 1775, as they
prepared for battle against the British Empire.1
When the government seeks to “enslave, or destroy” the people, the
latter “have no other remedy in this . . . but to appeal to Heaven.”
—John Locke, English philosopher (1691).2
INTRODUCTION
The logic of democracy entails that people possess the right to alter or abolish
their government.  For Americans, this premise is more than philosophy; it is their
history.  And no document more famously articulated the rights of the people than
did the Declaration of Independence.  Read the key passage:  “[W]henever any Form
of Government becomes destructive of these ends [that is, the unalienable rights of life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness], it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish
it, and to institute new Government . . . .”3  Here was presented the right of a people
to destroy and create government as they saw fit.  But the people depicted in the
Declaration invoked something morally higher than themselves to justify the right: 
God.  The Declaration explained:  “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalien-
able Rights . . . .”4  Should government destroy these God-given rights, people may,
with God’s blessing, alter or abolish it.5
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1 PATRICIA U. BONOMI, UNDER THE COPE OF HEAVEN: RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS
IN COLONIAL AMERICA 215–16 (1986).
2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 379 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690).
3 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
4 Id.
5 The passage below presents the proposition that the Declaration sought out God’s
approval in overthrowing British rule:
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In articulating this view, the Declaration was not alone.  The Committee of
Correspondence, on behalf of aggrieved Bostonians, drafted a document in 1772 that
protested British rule.6  Their complaints drew on the principle that “the right to free-
dom being the gift of God Almighty, it is not in the power of Man to alienate this gift,
and voluntarily become a slave.”7  In a similar vein, the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution
stated that government ought “to enable the individuals who compose it to enjoy their
natural rights and the other blessings which the author of existence has bestowed upon
man.”8  Whenever government reneges on this pledge, “the people have a right, by
common consent, to change it.”9  The 1777 Vermont Constitution contained identical
language.10  Connecticut’s 1776 Constitution announced:  “The People of this State,
being by the Providence of God, free and independent, have the sole and exclusive
Right of governing themselves . . . .”11  Massachusetts’s 1780 Declaration of Rights
acknowledged “with grateful hearts, the goodness of the Great Legislature of the
Universe” for “His Providence” in affording the Americans an opportunity to abolish
British rule and to create a new government of the people in “solemn compact with
each other.”12
This Article explores the religious origins of the right to alter or abolish govern-
ment.13  I show in Part I that the right was widely accepted among the American col-
onies as expressed through their constitutions and, later, the Federal Constitution.  In
Part II, I usher the reader back in time and across the Atlantic to seventeenth century
England.  There, I introduce two men who would have abhorred everything about
American constitutional democracy—King James I and the faithful philosopher Sir
Robert Filmer.  Both men, prominent in their respective domains of authority, devoted
themselves to the governing axiom that kings were bequeathed a right by God to abso-
lute rule.  Part III sketches the seventeenth century arguments of two other Englishmen,
also prominent—the philosophers John Locke and Algernon Sidney—who challenged
[T]he United States of America, . . . appealing to the Supreme Judge of
the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by
Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and
declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free
and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to
the British Crown . . . .
Id. at para. 32 (emphasis omitted).
6 THE RIGHTS OF THE COLONISTS AND A LIST OF INFRINGEMENTS AND VIOLATIONS OF
RIGHTS (1772), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 200 (1971) [hereinafter BILL OF RIGHTS].
7 Id. at 202.
8 PA. CONST. of 1776, pmbl.
9 Id.
10 VT. CONST. of 1777, pmbl.
11 CONN. CONST. of 1776, pmbl.
12 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pmbl.
13 I do not mean to suggest that the right to alter or abolish government lacks secular origins.
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James and Filmer.  Locke and Sidney argued that God had never sanctioned the divine
right of kings and instead had justified the people’s right to overthrow tyrants.
The arguments of Locke and Sidney, as I show in subsequent sections, influenced
the American clergy who supported war against Britain and the right of revolution in
general.  Indeed, the development of this connection will occupy me for the remainder
of the Article, but, in Part IV, I take a brief respite to summarize the historical circum-
stances that severely hampered governmental control over religion in colonial America
and thus provided partially autonomous spaces for people to reflect on religion, in-
cluding in ways that would inform their right to alter or abolish government.  I illustrate
in Part V how several prominent American clergymen, following Locke and Sidney,
rejected as impossible the divine and supposedly infallible status of rulers.  God, the
clergy insisted, was the only one who could claim such infallibility; the clergy warned
that rulers would do well to devote themselves to the people’s well-being, not the
former’s aggrandizement.  In Part VI, I argue that, again echoing Locke and Sidney,
a prominent group of American clergymen insisted that, contrary to the antidemocratic
jeers of monarchists, God had given people the capacity for reason which enabled them
to make meaningful decisions about their political future.  I conclude by illustrating
how the Federal and state constitutions following the American Revolution sought
to protect conditions for the faithful to contemplate the religious meaning of the right
to alter or abolish government.
Before I launch into my arguments, a proviso must be tendered.  I do not claim
that most of the clergy during the Revolution conscripted religion as a democratic
banner, let alone participated in the war on any level.14  In this respect, most of the
clergymen resembled the scores of colonists who remained outwardly indifferent to
the Revolution.15  But not all of the American clergy were so silent, and it is this group
whose views I wish to bring to the fore.  These views, I argue, help us to come to terms
with the religious background of the right to alter or abolish government that informs
the Declaration of Independence as well as the state and Federal constitutions.
I. THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT TO ALTER OR
ABOLISH GOVERNMENT
A. The State Constitutions and the Federal Constitution
Before the Constitutional Convention in 1787, nearly all of the thirteen colonies
had adopted constitutions announcing the right of a people to alter or abolish their
governments.16  And by “governments,” the state constitutions meant both state and
14 JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH: CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
194–95 (1990).
15 See id. at 202–03.
16 See Bernard Schwartz, Commentary to the United States Constitution, in 1 BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 435.
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federal.  Usually, the right of self-determination was attached to the state constitutions
by way of a declaration of rights, precursors to the first eight amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, or, as they are sometimes called, the Bill of Rights.17
Consider the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was appended to the 1776
Virginia Constitution:
[G]overnment is . . . instituted for the common benefit, protection
and security of the people, nation or community . . . and that
when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to
these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable,
unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform, alter, or abolish
it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public
weal.18
Notice how the people’s right to “alter or abolish” government applied to “any govern-
ment,” state or federal.  Indeed, the right, according to the Virginia Constitution, was
broad enough to permit Virginians—even before the Declaration of Independence—
to throw off British rule as well:  “[T]he government of this country, as formerly
exercised under the crown of Great Britain, is totally dissolved. . . .  We therefore,
the Delegates and Representatives of the good people of Virginia, having maturely
considered the premises, . . . do ordain and declare the future form of government
of Virginia . . . .”19
The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution was no less insistent about the right of the
people to create and destroy any government.  Its Preamble read:
The end of the institution . . . of government, is to secure the
existence of the body-politic; to protect it; and to furnish the indi-
viduals who compose it, with the power of enjoying, in safety and
tranquility, their natural rights, and the blessings of life:  And
whenever these great objects are not obtained, the people have
a right to alter the government, and to take measures necessary
for their safety, prosperity and happiness.20
The people, we are told, have a right to “alter the government” whenever it fails to live
up to its purpose.  We may thus infer that the citizens of Massachusetts had asserted a
right to alter or abolish not just the state government, but the federal government too.
Other examples are available.  The 1777 New York Constitution quoted promis-
cuously from the Declaration of Independence:
17 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63–64 (1947).
18 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § III (emphasis added).
19 VA. CONST. of 1776, pmbl. (emphasis omitted).
20 MASS. CONST. of 1781, pmbl. (emphasis added).
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[G]overnments are instituted among men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any
form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
government, laying its foundation on such principles . . . as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.21
New Yorkers did not exempt the federal government from being altered or abolished;
note the reference to “any form of government.”  North Carolina manifested similar
views.  First, its 1776 Constitution pronounced that “all government under the said
King within the said Colonies hath ceased, and a total Dissolution of Government in
many of them hath taken Place.”22  Next, its Declaration of Rights identified what had
replaced the king:  “[A]ll Political Power is vested in, and derived from, the People
only.”23  If all political power belonged to the people, the people presumably could use
it against any government—federal or state.  Look also to Delaware’s and Maryland’s
declarations of rights, both passed in 1776.  Both contained the following identical
language in their first sections:  “[A]ll Government of Right originates from the People,
is founded in Compact only, and instituted solely for the Good of the Whole.”24  The
people, then, may alter or abolish any government, federal or state, if it irredeemably
hurts the “good of the whole.”  Analogous conclusions can be drawn from the 1777
Georgia Constitution which stated that it was made for the people, “from whom all
power originates, and for whose benefit all government is intended.”25  Ditto for New
Hampshire’s 1783 Bill of Rights, which began by declaring that “[a]ll Men are born
equally free and independent; therefore, all government of right originates from the
people, is founded in consent, and instituted for the general good.”26
The 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution affirmed that “all government,” and hence
also the federal government, “ought to be instituted . . . for the security and protection
of the community as such, and to enable the individuals who compose it to enjoy their
natural rights.”27  “[W]henever these great ends of government are not obtained,” the
Pennsylvania Constitution continued, “the people have a right, by common consent,
to change it . . . .”28  Vermont’s 1777 Constitution also announced that “all govern-
ment,” thus including the federal government, “ought to be instituted and supported
for the security and protection of the community as such, and to enable the individuals
21 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, pmbl. (emphasis added).
22 N.C. CONST. of 1776, pmbl.
23 N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § I.
24 DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES of 1776, § 1 (emphasis
added); MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 1.
25 GA. CONST. of 1777, pmbl. (emphasis added).
26 N.H. CONST. of 1783, pt. I, art. I (emphasis added).
27 PA. CONST. of 1776, pmbl.
28 Id.
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who compose it to enjoy their natural rights.”29  Vermont’s Constitution admonished: 
“[W]henever those great ends of government are not obtained, the people have a right
by common consent to change it . . . .”30
Connecticut’s 1776 Declaration of Rights began with this preface:
The People of this State, being by the Providence of God, free
and independent, have the sole and exclusive Right of governing
themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent State; and having
from their Ancestors derived a free and excellent Constitution of
Government whereby the Legislature depends on the free and
annual Election of the People, they have the best Security for the
Preservation of their civil and religious Rights and Liberties.31
The people of Connecticut must be understood as reserving a right to alter or abolish
any government.  For they are said to have the “sole and exclusive Right of govern-
ing themselves.”32
Given such language by Connecticut and the other states, it would have been
unthinkable for the Constitution’s framers, who would convene in Philadelphia in
1787, to have expected the people to support the Constitution unless the people saw
it as preserving their right to alter or abolish any government, including the federal
government.  What evidence do we have that the Constitution protected this right? 
Most obviously, there is the Constitution’s Preamble, which made clear who held
political authority:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more per-
fect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.33
Neither king nor parliament but “We the People” established the Constitution, for
“ourselves” and “our” posterity.
James Madison, conventionally regarded as the Constitution’s architect,34 declared
that “the people are the only legitimate fountain of power,” and that “it is from them
that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of government hold
29 VT. CONST. of 1777, pmbl. (emphasis added).
30 Id. (emphasis added).
31 CONN. CONST. of 1776, pmbl.
32 Id.
33 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
34 FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 205 (1985).
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their power, is derived.”35  Another important framer, Alexander Hamilton, was
annoyed by those who clamored for a bill of rights against governmental abuse.  The
Preamble, Hamilton defended, signified that “the people surrender nothing; and as
they retain every thing, they have no need of particular reservations.”36  He reassured
that the Preamble “is a better recognition of popular rights, than volumes of those
aphorisms, . . . which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics, than in a con-
stitution of government.”37  Noah Webster, the constitutional framer and dictionary
author, announced to the public that “[t]he powers vested in Congress are little more
than nominal; nay real power cannot be vested in them, nor in any body, but in the
people.”38  “The source of power,” proclaimed Webster, “is in the people of this
country, and cannot for ages, and probably never will, be removed.”39
The Preamble did more than locate authority in the people.  It also stated that the
people had created the Constitution for defined purposes in justice, liberty, common
defense, and more.  Should the government be unable or unwilling to realize these ends,
the people, by inference, would be entitled to modify, resist, or dissolve it.  After all,
if “We the People” . . . “do ordain and establish this Constitution,” as the Preamble
stated,40 it was only because, as the Declaration of Independence previously had an-
nounced, “We, the People” did “[a]bsolve[] . . . all Allegiance to the British Crown.”41 
Worth reading here is Hamilton’s Federalist 78, which held that the “fundamental prin-
ciple of republican government” in the Constitution “admits the right of the people
to alter or abolish the established constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with
their happiness.”42
By 1791, after ardent insistence by the state ratification conventions,43 two crucial
amendments amplified the people’s right of revolution.  The Ninth Amendment states: 
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
35 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 261 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001).
36 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 35, at 445.
37 Id.
38 NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION (1787), reprinted in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE
“OTHER” FEDERALISTS 1787–1788, at 398 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds.,
1998) [hereinafter FRIENDS].
39 Id.
40 U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
41 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 52 (U.S. 1776).
42 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 35, at 406 (emphasis added).
Worth reading also is Madison’s Federalist 39. He argues that the Constitution should guar-
antee that the government is “strictly republican.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison),
supra note 35, at 194. For “[i]t is evident that no other form would be reconcileable with the
genius of the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the revolution; or with that
honourable determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political
experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government.” Id.
43 See infra Part I.B.
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or disparage others retained by the people.”44  The Tenth Amendment follows with
these words:  “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”45  Even prior to these amendments, we should remember that Article V
gave to people the right to amend the Constitution and, hence, to alter or abolish
their government.46
Putting aside for now the Constitution’s text, let’s examine what the people, in
whose name it was written, thought about it.  When the framers finished their work
in 1787, the Federal Constitution was simply a proposal.  The people had to decide
whether to adopt it.  From 1787 to 1790, the people in the original thirteen states sent
delegates with instructions to represent their interests in state ratification conven-
tions.47  I will show that the people, acting through their delegates, either accepted the
Constitution as recognizing their right to alter or abolish government or proposed
amendments demanding more explicit recognition of such a right.
B. State Ratification Conventions
After the Constitution was made publicly available, state ratification conventions
urged Congress to amend the Constitution in a manner that more clearly recognized
a right to alter or abolish government.  Those states that refrained from proposing
amendments generally did so because they had construed the Constitution as already
protective of such a right.
Consider the amendments proposed by the North Carolina convention in 1789. 
First, the delegates wanted acknowledgement that “there are certain natural rights of
which men, when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity,
among which are the enjoyment of life, and liberty.”48  Second, unsatisfied with the
Preamble, North Carolina requested more explicit language that “all power is naturally
vested in, and consequently derived from the people; that magistrates therefore are their
trustees, and agents, and at all times amenable to them.”49  Third, North Carolina
insisted that “[g]overnment ought to be instituted for the common benefit . . . of the
people” and, defiantly, it ridiculed “the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary
power and oppression” as “absurd, slavish, and destructive to the good and happiness
of mankind.”50
44 U.S. CONST. amend. IX (emphasis added).
45 U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
46 U.S. CONST. art. V.
47 See infra Part I.B.
48 Ratification of the Constitution by the State of North Carolina (Nov. 21, 1789), in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
1786–1870, at 266 (1998) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION].
49 Id.
50 Id. at 266–67.
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The Maryland ratification convention in 1788 bade a similar message to Congress. 
Maryland requested Congress to include in the Constitution “that all persons intrusted
with the legislative or executive powers of government are the trustees and servants
of the public; and, as such, accountable for their conduct.”51  Next, Maryland alerted
Congress that “[w]herefore, whenever the ends of government are perverted, and
public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual,
the people may, and of right ought to, reform the old, or establish a new govern-
ment.”52  And for good measure, Maryland, like North Carolina, wanted acknowl-
edgement by the Constitution that “[t]he doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary
power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness
of mankind.”53
Virginia’s ratification convention adopted almost identical language.54  Prior to
their state’s ratification, those Virginians endorsing the Constitution often argued that
under its terms, the people possess the authority to create and destroy their govern-
ment.  Several of these arguments were authored, as was common, under pseudonyms. 
“Americanus” declared in the Virginia Independent Chronicle that “all power origi-
nally resides in the people . . . [and] that the people have an indefeasible right to insti-
tute, amend, or annihilate governments, when it seemeth good unto them.”55  Also
urging ratification in the Chronicle was “The State Soldier”:
Men in power may usurp authorities under any constitution—
and those they govern may oppose their tyranny:  For although
it be wrong to refuse the legal currency of one’s country, yet
there can be no harm in rejecting base coin, since there is no state
in the world which compels a man to take that which is under its
own standard.56
“An Impartial Citizen” claimed in the Petersburg Virginia Gazette that the
Constitution would permit the people to “displace the usurpers, who would not be
permitted to sit or act as Congress.”57  “Either this would be the case,” he continued,
51 A Fragment of Facts, Disclosing the Conduct of the Maryland Convention, on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 547, 553 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.,
Ayer Co. 1987) (1888).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Virginia (June 26, 1788), in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 145.
55 Americanus I, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Dec. 5, 1787, reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
BY THE STATES 200 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
56 The State Soldier I, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 16, 1788, reprinted in 8 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 55, at 308.
57 An Impartial Citizen VI, PETERSBURG VA. GAZETTE, Mar. 13, 1788, reprinted in 8
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“or the Federal Union would be dissolved, and the powers of Congress would again
devolve to the constituent States.”58  Dubbed “The Society of Western Gentlemen,”
a coterie of Virginia Antifederalists called for an amendment stating that “the best
form of government, is that which will produce the greatest common good, . . . and
when any government is found inadequate to these purposes, the people have a right
to alter or abolish the same.”59  George Mason, the eminent Antifederalist and drafter
of the Virginia Declaration of Rights,60 joined the chorus that the following words be
included in the Constitution:  “[T]hat the Doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary
Power and Oppression is absurd, slavish and destructive of the good and Happiness
of Mankind.”61  George Nicholas, another Virginia delegate, remarked at the state con-
vention:  “If [the Congress] exceed[s] these [constitutional] powers, the Judiciary will
declare it void.  If not, the people will have a right to declare it void.”62
Virginia’s governor, Edmund Randolph, asked Congress to amend the Constitution
to read “that all authority not given, is retained by the people, and may be resumed
when perverted to their oppression; and that no right can be cancelled, abridged, or
restrained, by the Congress, or any officer of the United States.”63  James Madison,
now having to defend as a delegate the Constitution which he helped to write, told his
fellow Virginians that Randolph’s proposal “correspond[s] precisely with my opin-
ion.”64  Specifically, Madison reiterated that “the powers granted by the proposed
Constitution, are the gift of the people, and may be resumed by them when perverted
to their oppression, and every power not granted thereby, remains with the people, and
at their will.”65  Later, Madison would propose in the U.S. House of Representatives
that the Congress should add to the Preamble the following words:  “That the people
have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their
Government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its insti-
tution.”66  Professor Akhil Amar noted that “[n]ot a single representative quarreled
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 497.
58 Id.
59 The Society of Western Gentlemen Revise the Constitution, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 30,
1788 & May 7, 1788 (Extra), reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at  772–73.
60 Bernard Schwartz, Commentary to the Virginia Declaration of Rights, in 1 BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 231.
61 Letter from George Mason to John Lamb (June 9, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 55, at 819.
62 George Nicholas, Remarks at the Virginia Constitutional Ratification Convention
(June 16, 1788), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 1326, 1327.
63 Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia, Remarks at the Virginia Constitutional
Ratification Convention (June 21, 1788), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at
1450, 1456.
64 James Madison, Remarks at the Virginia Constitutional Ratification Convention (June 24,
1788), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 1498, 1501.
65 Id. at 1501–02.
66 James Madison, Speech Introducing Proposed Constitutional Amendments (June 8,
1789), in THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: PRIMARY SOURCES 332, 338 (Bruce Frohnen ed., 2002).
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quarreled with Madison on the substance of this claim, although some considered
any prefix superfluous.”67
Rhode Island, the last state to ratify, also felt compelled to propose amendments
to Congress.  The delegates there requested that Congress include in the Constitution
an acknowledgement of “certain natural rights, of which men when they form a social
compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the enjoyment of
Life and Liberty.”68  So, too, the convention desired language to the effect that “all
power is naturally vested in, and consequently derived from the People; that magis-
trates therefore are their trustees and agents, and at all times amenable to them.”69 
Lastly, the delegates requested an amendment that “the powers of government may be
reassumed by the people, whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness.”70 
Rhode Island’s proposals were nothing new to the delegates in New York, who had
recommended something nearly identical to the former, two years prior.71
Massachusetts’s convention did not ask Congress to include an explicit right to
resist unlawful government.  But newspaper articles published at the time of the rati-
fication convention in 1788 illustrated an understanding among Bay Staters that the
Constitution had recognized the people’s right to alter or abolish government.  Read
how the Salem Mercury expressed its approval for the Constitution’s Preamble:  “‘We
the People,’ &c. is a complete declaration, that the People are the Source of Power—
that they make the constitution—and that, whenever they find it incompatible with
their interests, they have a right to abolish it.—Where, then, can be the mighty danger
in adopting it?”72  The Boston Gazette yearned for a constitution in which the people
could retain the powers to alter or abolish government:
Q.  When ought a new government to be established?
A.  When the old becomes impracticable, or dangerous to the
rights of the people.
Q.  Who ought to form a new constitution of government?
A.  The people.
Q.  From whom ought public persons to derive their authority to
govern?
A.  From the people whom they are to govern. . . .
Q.  How is such a government to be obtained?
67 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 27 (1998).
68 Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Rhode Island (May 29, 1790), in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 310, 311.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New York (July 26, 1788), in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 190–91.
72 Editorial, SALEM MERCURY, Jan. 8, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 55, at 652.
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A.  By forming a constitution which regards men more than
things, . . . and by delegating the powers of government so that
the people may always have it in their power to resume them,
when abused, without tumult or confusion . . . .73
Elsewhere in Massachusetts, the “Remarker” explained in The Independent
Chronicle that the Constitution, if ratified, could not divest the people of their power
because “no cause can operate to this effect,—because the people, are always both
able and ready, to resist the encroachments of Supreme Power.”74  The Massachusetts
Gazette wrote that the Constitution “will now, probably, be submitted to the people
to ratify or reject, who are the fountain of all power, to whom alone it of right be-
longs to make or unmake constitutions or forms of government, at their pleasure.”75 
Elbridge Gerry, a constitutional framer and, later, Vice President, was a member of
Massachusetts’s ratification convention.76  He urged Congress to include in the
Constitution the rights of the people to resist their government.  One of his pam-
phlets read that
the origin of all power is in the people, and that they have an
incontestible right to check the creatures of their own creation,
vested with certain powers to guard the life, liberty and property
of the community:  And if certain selected bodies of men, deputed
on these principles, determine contrary to the wishes and expec-
tations of their constituents, the people have an undoubted right
to reject their decisions . . . .77
Delegates to Pennsylvania’s ratification convention in 1787 also voiced their
belief that the people must possess the right to alter or abolish their government, and
that the Constitution did not threaten such a right.  Thomas Hartley spoke to his fellow
delegates:  “As soon as the independence of America was declared in the year 1776,
from that instant all our natural rights were restored to us, and we were at liberty to
adopt any form of government to which our views or our interest might incline us.”78 
73 BOSTON GAZETTE, Nov. 19, 1787, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
55, at 275 (emphasis added).
74 Remarker, THE INDEP. CHRON., Dec. 27, 1787, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 55, at 529.
75 Editorial, MASS. GAZETTE, Oct. 30, 1787, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 55, at 172.
76 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, FOUNDING FATHERS: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO THE MEN
WHO MADE AMERICA 94–95 (2007).
77 ELBRIDGE GERRY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONVENTIONS (1788), reprinted in 1 BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 484 (emphasis
added).
78 Thomas Hartley, Remarks at the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 30, 1787), in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 430.
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Then there was James Wilson, a future Supreme Court Justice, one of six men to sign
both the Constitution and the Declaration, and, not least, the Preamble’s author.79  At
the Pennsylvania ratification convention, Wilson, now serving as a delegate, attempted
to quell those who complained of the framers’ failure to include a bill of rights.  He
said that the Constitution was governed by the authority of the people as made evi-
dent in the Preamble’s opening words, “We the People of the United States.”80  The
Constitution, Wilson stressed, was “announced in their name—it receives its political
existence from their authority:  they ordain and establish.”81  And, he added, “[t]hose
who ordain and establish have the power, if they think proper, to repeal and annul.”82 
In short, for Wilson the Preamble meant that “the citizens of the United States may
always say, WE reserve the right to do what we please.”83  After not so humbly in-
voking his authority as the only delegate to Pennsylvania’s convention who was a
framer,84 Wilson delivered these words:
For, I insist, if there are errors in government the people have the
right not only to correct and amend them, but likewise totally to
change and reject its form; and under the operation of that right,
the citizens of the United States can never be wretched beyond
retrieve, unless they are wanting to themselves.85
Another Pennsylvania delegate, John Smilie, urged that the Constitution include
a bill of rights acknowledging the people’s right to alter or abolish government:
[T]he supreme authority naturally rests in the people, but does it
follow that therefore a declaration of rights would be superfluous? 
Because the people have a right to alter and abolish government,
79 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 7 (2005).
80 James Wilson, Remarks of James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the
Constitution of the United States (1787), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 178, 193
(Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007) (emphasis omitted).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 196. Amar argued that the “[p]reamble-style ratification also broke new ground
by establishing that the people’s right to alter government did not require proof [as did the
Declaration of Independence] of past tyranny.” AMAR, supra note 79, at 12. This seems to be
correct but the Constitution would also seem to require justification for political change. Most
notably, the Preamble states that the Constitution is established to advance “Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty.” U.S. CONST. pmbl. Accordingly, if you wished to change,
resist, or dissolve the government through constitutional means, you would probably need to
show that the government is thwarting one or more of these objectives.
84 James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Convention, as reported by Alexander J.
Dallas (Nov. 24, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 340.
85 Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
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can it therefore be inferred that every step taken to secure that right
would be superfluous and nugatory?  The truth is that unless some
criterion is established by which it could be easily and consti-
tutionally ascertained how far our governors may proceed, and
by which it might appear when they transgress their jurisdiction,
this idea of altering and abolishing government is a mere sound
without substance.86
As these statements suggest, the people, either through their delegates or as articu-
lated in their newspaper articles, believed that the Constitution recognized their rights
to alter or abolish government, as first enunciated in the Declaration of Independence.
One might be inclined to believe that the right to alter or abolish government de-
rives from secular philosophical sources in democratic theory or perhaps civic repub-
licanism.  I argue in the next section, however, that the right finds a significant strand
of its genealogy in religion.
II. DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS
Much of the colonial Americans’ conception of the right to alter or abolish gov-
ernment began with ideas that would foment in seventeenth century England.  For it
was there that the intellectual predecessors to the American colonists would develop
and sharpen their arguments against absolute monarchy.87  Central to the attack on
absolute monarchy was the attempt by some in civil society to reclaim from the king
the political uses of religion.  God, these critics argued, permitted and probably even
urged the people to alter or abolish government when it threatened to oppress them.88 
These subversive uses of religion would influence, as I show later, how the American
colonists would formulate the substance of the people’s general right to alter or
abolish government.89
A. King James I
The divine right of kings—the idea that God bestowed political authority on the
king—and the theory that the king wielded absolute sovereignty were not the same
thing.90  For example, the philosopher Thomas Hobbes argued provocatively in 1651
that a king could acquire absolute sovereignty through authorization by ordinary
86 John Smilie, Remarks at the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 55, at 385 (emphasis added).
87 See Thomas G. West, foreword to ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING
GOVERNMENT, at xv (Thomas G. West ed., Liberty Fund 1996) (1698).
88 See infra Section V.
89 See infra Sections V & VI.
90 GLENN BURGESS, ABSOLUTE MONARCHY AND THE STUART CONSTITUTION 96 (1996).
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men.91  His was a minority view though, and in the early seventeenth century the
divine right of kings had come to underwrite absolute sovereignty.92
No more visible institutional spokesman for this union existed in seventeenth
century England than King James I, the same James who commissioned the English
translation of the Bible.93  Having convened the Lords and Commons in his palace at
Whitehall on March 21, 1609, James issued a majestic encomium, not to Parliament,
of course, but to his office.94  He solemnly announced that the “State of MONARCHIE
is the supremest thing upon earth.”95  “For Kings are not onely GODS Lieutenants upon
earth, and sit upon GODS throne, but even by GOD himselfe they are called Gods.”96 
This stout confidence was sometimes prone to equivocation, as when James hinted
that God would punish monarchs who offended Him,97 and recent scholarship sug-
gests that James introduced, if inadvertently, moral and perhaps even legal limits to his
rule.98  Be that as it may, James’s words, read straightforwardly, were adamant on his
right to absolute rule by virtue of his godly status.  The captive listeners at Whitehall
should have been familiar with his pronouncements, for James had rehearsed them
elsewhere.  In his 1598 pamphlet titled The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, for in-
stance, he turned to scripture to show that “Kings are called Gods by the prophetical
King David, because they sit upon GOD his Throne in the earth, and have the count of
their administration to give unto him.”99
At Whitehall, James continued that “Kings are justly called Gods” because “they
exercise a manner or resemblance of Divine power.”100  God had the power, James
explained, “to create, or destroy, make, or unmake at his pleasure, to give life, or send
death, to judge all, and to bee judged nor accomptable to none:  To raise low things,
and to make high things low at his pleasure, and to God are both soule and body
due.”101  “And the like power have Kings,” James concluded.102  Kings “make and
91 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 109–110, §§ 13, 15 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publishing
Co. 1994) (1651).
92 See BURGESS, supra note 90, at 96–102.
93 ADAM NICOLSON, GOD’S SECRETARIES: THE MAKING OF THE KING JAMES BIBLE xi
(2003).
94 King James I, A Speach to the Lords and Commons of Parliament at White-Hall (Mar. 10,
1609), in KING JAMES VI AND I: POLITICAL WRITINGS 179, 181 (Johann P. Sommerville ed.,
1994). I have modernized some of the spelling in this source.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 KING JAMES I, THE TREW LAW OF FREE MONARCHIES: OR THE RECIPROCK AND
MUTUALL DUTIE BETWIXT A FREE KING, AND HIS NATURAL SUBJECTS (1598), reprinted in
KING JAMES VI AND I: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 94, at 62, 72.
98 BURGESS, supra note 90, at 104–05 (noting that King James himself implied that, despite
general discussion of absolute divine rights, a particular king is often limited by the laws of his
particular kingdom, specifically in the areas of taxation and the rule of law).
99 KING JAMES I, supra note 97, at 64.
100 King James I, supra note 94, at 181.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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unmake their subjects:  they have power of raising, and casting downe:  of life, and
of death:  Judges over all their subjects, and in all causes, and yet accomptable to none
but God onely.”103
Unsurprisingly, James next argued that the duties of subjects toward their king
corresponded with the allegiance owed to God.  So James insisted in the speech at
Whitehall that to the king “is due both the affection of the soule, and the service of
the body of his subjects.”104  He summoned examples from the Bible, most notably
Paul’s epistle to the Romans.105  (Remember this—Paul’s epistle—for it will be the
philosophical currency that will be tendered by advocates for divine right as well as,
later, by the American colonists who will condemn everything that divine right stands
for.) James stressed that Paul had ordered the Romans to obey the Emperor Nero “and
serve for conscience sake,” even though the latter was a “bloody tyrant, an infamie
to his aage, and a monster to the world, being also an idolatrous persecuter, as the King
of Babel was.”106  Was it not, therefore, nothing less than “shamelesse presumption,”
James snorted, that some Christians in his seventeenth century England, openly critical
of the king, should “claime to that unlawfull libertie, which God refused to his owne
peculiar and chosen people?”107  Paul, or so James claimed, insisted that the obedi-
ence of the people “ought to be to [the king], as to Gods Lieutenant in earth, obeying
his commands in all things . . . acknowledging him a Judge set by GOD over them,
having power to judge them, but to be judged onely by GOD, whom to onely hee
must give count of his judgement.”108  Even when the king appeared to do something
“unlawfull,” James intoned that according to Paul, the people should respond “without
resistance, but by sobbes and teares to God.”109  Monarchs may misbehave, of course,
but James told the people to leave punishment to God.110
That James could have found an audience for his megalomania might seem in-
credible today.  Yet the instinct to embrace something like the divine right of kings
is, explained Cambridge historian John Neville Figgis, “as old as history.”111  As
Professor Figgis observed, “[i]n some form the sanctity of kingship has been held
from very early times.”112  Most primitive tribes “seem to have thrown some sort of
halo round the person of the chief,”113 and there existed “the intimate connection
between kingship and priesthood.”114  The Middle Ages in Western Europe ushered
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Romans 13.
106 KING JAMES I, supra note 97, at 71–72 (emphasis omitted).
107 Id. at 72.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. (James adds the Latin phrase, “Preces, & Lachryma sunt arma Ecclesic,” which
translates, “prayers and tears are the weapons of the Church.”).
111 JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS 17 (2d ed. 1914).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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the widespread view that “all in authority, were the vicars of God, and that resis-
tance to their commands was, in general, a damnable sin.”115
Certainly, in the early seventeenth century, James had public supporters.  And
several of them were England’s lawyers and judges.  The distinguished jurist Sir
Edward Coke proclaimed that “‘the kingdom of England is an absolute monarchy’
of which ‘the king is the only supreme governor,’ having been empowered ‘immedi-
ately of almighty God.’”116  Other lawyers chimed in.  Henry Finch commented that
“‘[c]arrying God’s stamp and mark among men, and being . . . a God upon earth, as
God is a king in heaven,’ it followed that the English king had ‘a shadow of the ex-
cellencies that are in God.’”117  Edmund Plowden announced that “‘king is a name of
continuance, which shall always endure as the head and governor of the people.’”118 
For James Morrice, “the king was ‘supreme head and governor’ of the body politic
of the kingdom, ‘adorned with princely rights and dignities.’”119  Sir Thomas Elyot,
law clerk and future ambassador, likened the king to a “‘principal bee,’” a high com-
pliment in a politically turbulent England where bees were praised for their love of
collective order.120  “‘God,’” Elyot explained, “‘having showed in [bees] unto men an
express pattern of a perfect monarchy, the most natural and absolute form of govern-
ment.’”121  Sir Thomas Smith, ambassador to France, privy councillor, and secretary of
state, asserted in a bestselling book that the king was “the life, the head, the authority
of all things done in England, though he might sometimes distribute his authority
and power to lesser agencies within the state.”122
The law gave force to these sentiments.123  As historians Corinne Weston and
Janelle Greenberg remarked:
To carry out his high responsibilities the king possessed certain
royal prerogatives, which included making war and peace, coin-
ing money, appointing ministers and councillors, summoning
115 Id. at 19.
116 CORINNE COMSTOCK WESTON & JANELLE RENFROW GREENBERG, SUBJECTS AND
SOVEREIGNS: THE GRAND CONTROVERSY OVER LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY IN STUART ENGLAND 8
(1981) (quoting Caudrey’s Case, (1591) 5 Co. Rep. 1a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1 (K.B.)).
117 Id. (quoting HENRY FINCH, LAW, OR A DISCOURSE THEREOF (1627)).
118 Id. (quoting Hill v. Grange, 1 Pl. Com. 164, 75 Eng. Rep. 253 (K.B.), reprinted in
Edmund Plowdon, THE COMMENTARIES OR REPORTS 178 (1816)).
119 Id. at 9 (quoting James Morrice, A Reading of the Midle Temple full of excellent good
discourse and learninge circa 21 Eliz R. (1578), reprinted in Edward T. Lampson, The Royal
Prerogative, 1485–1603 (1938) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University)).
120 Id. (quoting CHARLES BUTLER, THE FEMINIE MONARCHIE: OR, A TEATISE CONCERNING
BEES, AND THE DUE ORDERING OF THEM  2–6 (1609)).
121 Id. (quoting SIR THOMAS ELYOT, THE BOKE NAMED GOVERNOR 7 (S.E. Lehmberg ed.,
1962) (1531)).
122 Id. (quoting SIR THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 62–63 (L. Alston ed.,
1906) (1583)).
123 See id. at 10.
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and dissolving parliament, and mitigating the rigor of the law
and facilitating justice by means of the dispensing power and its
corollary, the pardoning power.124
In the authoritative words of Sir Edward Coke, “‘no act can bind the king from any
prerogative which is sole and inseparable to his person, but that he may dispense with
it by a non obstante [the operative words in a clause of dispensation].’”125  Other privi-
leges flowed to the king.  He could not be sued; petition was the only option for the
aggrieved.126  Tolls and tributes could not touch his property and chattels.127  He could
not be considered a joint tenant because no one was his equal, and he was immune from
common recoveries.128  The king, by contrast, could sue in any court and set the pro-
cedures therein.129  All of this suggested that “[m]ost of Protestant England believed
unquestioning obedience to the king was not only the old but the best way.”130
Such was the support for King James, but no one rallied more prominently to his
cause than did Sir Robert Filmer whom I discuss next.
B. Sir Robert Filmer
If not the first philosopher to laud King James’s brand of the divine right of
kings,131 Filmer would assume a place in England and America as the most famous,
or especially in the latter, the most infamous.132  Filmer made claims that would have
met with cooing approval by James:
1. That there is no form of government but monarchy only.
2. That there is no monarchy, but paternal.
3. That there is no paternal monarchy, but absolute or arbitrary.
4. That there is no such thing as an aristocracy or democracy.
124 Id. at 10–11.
125 Id. at 11 (alteration in original) (quoting Case of Non Obstante, (1610) 12 Co. Rep. 18,
77 Eng. Rep. 1300 (K.B.)).
126 Id. at 10.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. The king, however, was not completely above the law. See id. at 12–13, 17 (explain-
ing, for example, that “Royal grants were limited by law and regularly argued in the Law
Courts,” and that the king could not “alter the nature of pleading”).
130 West, supra note 87, at xvii.
131 Johann P. Sommerville, Introduction to ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA AND OTHER
WRITINGS ix, xvi–xvii (Johann P. Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1680) (argu-
ing that Jean Bodin and Hadrian Saravia had predated and influenced Filmer’s understanding
of the divine right of kings).
132 FIGGIS, supra note 111, at 148 (“[Filmer’s] work won great and deserved popularity as
the ablest justification of the extreme royalist doctrine.”).
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5. That there is no such form of government as a tyranny.
6. That the people are not born free by nature.133
One of the statements—“That there is no such form of government as a tyranny”—
verily may have caused even James to blush.
Filmer’s propositions hinged on a stylized reading of the Old Testament.  God
did not grant political liberty to all people, Filmer argued, but had reserved for Adam
the right of lordship “over the whole world.”134  His was a right that was “as large and
ample as the absolutest dominion of any monarch which hath been since the cre-
ation.”135  It was also a right that God supposedly rooted in patriarchy.136  “To confirm
this natural right of regal power,” Filmer announced, “we find in the decalogue that
the law which enjoins obedience to kings is delivered in terms of ‘honour thy father’
[Exodus, xx, 12] as if all power were originally in the father.”137  “[T]his subjection
of children,” he added, “is the only fountain of all regal authority, by the ordination
of God himself,”138 and “the Scripture is not favourable to the liberty of the people.”139
Does Filmer really expect us to believe that kings of his day inherited their patri-
archy from an unbroken chain starting with Adam?  Apparently so.  He said flatly
that “[t]here is, and always shall be continued to the end of the world, a natural right
of a supreme father over every multitude, although, by the secret will of God, many
at first do most unjustly obtain the exercise of it.”140  If today people are ignorant of
Adam’s heir, “[i]t is but the negligence or ignorance of the people to lose the knowl-
edge of the true heir, for an heir there always is.”141  Filmer pledged that “[i]f Adam
himself were still living, and now ready to die, it is certain that there is one man, and
but one in the world, who is next heir, although the knowledge who should be that one
man be quite lost.”142
Filmer’s narrative awkwardly committed him to two impossible tasks of evidence. 
One, he would have had to chart a ludicrous genealogy stretching thousands of years
from Adam to present-day kings.  Two, he would have had to show that kings were
in fact biological fathers of their subjects.  Filmer knew that he could not do either,
133 SIR ROBERT FILMER, OBSERVATIONS UPON ARISTOTLES POLITIQUES TOUCHING
FORMS OF GOVERNMENT TOGETHER WITH DIRECTIONS FOR OBEDIENCE TO GOVERNOURS IN
DANGEROUS AND DOUBTFUL TIMES (1652), reprinted in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS,
supra note 131, at 281.
134 SIR ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA (1680), reprinted in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER
WRITINGS, supra note 131, at 7.
135 Id.
136 See id. at 7–8.
137 Id. at 11–12 (alteration in original).
138 Id. at 7.
139 Id. at 13.
140 Id. at 11.
141 Id. at 10.
142 Id.
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and opted lamely to invite the reader to accept that “all [kings] either are, or are to be
reputed as the next heirs to those progenitors who were at first the natural parents of
the whole people, and in their right succeed to the exercise of supreme jurisdiction.”143 
This clumsy corrective would seem to demolish, in effect, Filmer’s entire case for
taking the story of Adam on its face.
If Filmer’s arguments seem unsatisfactory, they were no more plausible to his
contemporary critics, John Locke and Algernon Sidney being the most eminent.
III. LOCKE AND SIDNEY CHALLENGE FILMER
The late seventeenth century English philosophers Locke and Sidney are now
cherished as two of the greatest proponents for limited government, and in the eigh-
teenth century they were among the most influential for the American leaders who
would wage war against Britain.144  Unfortunately for Filmer, Locke and Sidney
would use their substantial talents to pummel his ideas.  Both refuted the claim by
Filmer and King James that God had given to kings a right of absolute dominion;
both suggested instead that God had given to all peoples the right to alter or abolish
government.  In this sense, Locke and Sidney did not so much quash the basic idea
of divine right as relocate it from the king to the people.145  I will show in Parts V
and VI that the avowedly religious arguments crafted by Locke and Sidney found
expression among eighteenth century Americans who insisted on a right to alter or
abolish government.
Writing a few years after Filmer’s Patriarcha, Sidney and Locke did not pull
punches.  Sidney trashed Patriarcha as “a heap of incongruities and contradictions,”146
full of “big words and little sense,”147 and Locke mocked it as “glib Nonsence put
together in well sounding English.”148  Both writers accused Filmer of failing to de-
liver a coherent narrative about the fabled devise of patriarchy from Adam to present
day kings.149  Even granting that Adam, and after the Flood, Noah, might have been
mankind’s king, Sidney sighed that the rest of Filmer’s story unraveled of its own
logic.  Start with the premise that “the same law that gave to my father a power over
143 Id. (first alteration added) (emphasis added).
144 Professor Thomas West writes, “Thomas Jefferson regarded John Locke and Algernon
Sidney as the two leading sources for the American understanding of the principles of political
liberty and the rights of humanity.” West, supra note 87, at xv.
145 Professor John Figgis argues that “most of the English writers on behalf of resistance
[in the seventeenth century] assert for law and custom a claim to absolute authority by Divine
Right.” FIGGIS, supra note 111, at 177–78. Thus, for Figgis, “all theories of government [in
the seventeenth century] are theories of Divine Right.” Id. at 177.
146 ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 191 (Thomas G. West
ed., Liberty Fund 1996) (1698).
147 Id. at 309.
148 LOCKE, supra note 2, at 137–38 (emphasis omitted).
149 See id.; SIDNEY, supra note 146, at 191–92.
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me, gives me the like over my children; and if I had a thousand brothers, each of them
would have the same over their children.”150  If the power transmitted was absolute,
the number of kings in four thousand years, Sidney quipped, would be “equal to the
men that are in the world.”151  Besides, Filmer’s obtuse equation of authority with
inheritance would beseech “the wise, to depend on the will of fools; the strong and
valiant, to expect defence from the weak or cowardly; and all in general to receive
justice from him, who neither knows nor cares for it.”152  Such results would not have
been issued by a God “who disposes all things in wisdom and goodness, and appoints
a due place for all.”153
Locke was plainly vexed by Filmer’s blissfully naïve assumptions about inheritance:
I go on then to ask whether in the inheriting of this Paternal
Power, this Supreme Fatherhood, The Grand-Son by a Daughter,
hath a Right before a Nephew by a Brother?  Whether the Grand-
Son by the Eldest Son, being an Infant, before the Younger Son
a Man and able? . . .  [O]r any other Man, descended by a Male
Line?154
No matter, Locke could hardly believe that God would reward Adam with kingship
after the latter’s profligacy plunged mankind into sin.155  “[’T]would be hard to
imagine,” Locke retorted, “that God, in the same Breath, should make him Universal
Monarch over all Mankind, and a day labourer for his Life; turn him out of Paradise,
to till the Ground, and at the same time, advance him to a Throne, and all the Privi-
ledges and Ease of Absolute Power.”156  What Filmer gave us, groaned Locke, was
one dolt of a god.
This was just the beginning.  Locke and Sidney, as I show in the next sections,
used their attacks on Filmer as springboards for their defenses of people’s right to alter
or abolish government.
A. Sidney:  God’s Gift of Liberty to All
God, Sidney insisted, had not granted Adam the gift of global patriarchy, as Filmer
claimed; God instead had given to all men the gift of individual liberty.  “God in
goodness and mercy to mankind, hath with an equal hand given to all the benefit of
150 SIDNEY, supra note 146, at 22.
151 Id. at 29–30.
152 Id. at 23.
153 Id.
154 LOCKE, supra note 2, at 230.
155 Id. at 172 (arguing that Adam’s role in man’s fall, although smaller than Eve’s, was
nevertheless a disobedience to God and that Adam was punished with the need to “work for
his living” accordingly).
156 Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
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liberty, with some measure of understanding how to employ it . . . .”157  Sometimes,
Sidney dispatched a barebones definition of liberty as freedom from interference
(“being only an exemption from the dominion of another”);158 other times, liberty was
a more substantive idea about self-direction (“a capacity of judging what is good”).159 
Either way, Sidney held that God did not cause “some to be born with crowns upon
their heads, and all others with saddles upon their backs.”160  God, in other words,
would never have condoned Filmer’s thesis.
This didn’t mean that Sidney cheered for unfettered license.  “No one man or
family is able to provide that which is requisite for their convenience or security,”
Sidney observed, “whilst everyone has an equal right to everything, and none ac-
knowledges a superior to determine the controversies, that upon such occasions must
continually arise.”161  Wanting such a superior, men willingly submit themselves to
government.162  Yet the logic of liberty requires that men enter government only by
consent because “every man is a king till he divest himself of his right, in consider-
ation of something that he thinks better for him.”163  In this way, Sidney’s account of
God as the grantor of liberty served as the scaffold to prop up consent as the basis for
political legitimacy.164  As Sidney later stated, liberty is “the gift of God and nature,
no otherwise to be restrained than by laws made with [the people’s] consent.”165  Once
established, the government’s leaders have “no other power but what is so conferred
upon them by that multitude.”166  The leaders must work only for “the publick good,
for which they were instituted.”167
157 SIDNEY, supra note 146, at 20. Apparently lacking faith in the reader’s memory, Sidney
repeatedly asserts that people’s liberty was bestowed by God. There is, Sidney writes, “that
universal liberty which God hath given to mankind; and every man is a king till he divest
himself of his right, in consideration of something that he thinks better for him.” Id. at 25.
So, too, he states that there is a “principle of liberty in which God created us,” id. at 8; liberty
is “a universal right conferred upon [men] by God and nature,” id. at 49; liberty is “the gift
of God and nature,” id. at 130; liberty is “granted by God to all mankind,” id. at 189; liberty
is “a gift bestowed by God upon his children and people,” id. at 335; and that God “gave
[people] a law of liberty; and if they fell into the shame and misery that accompanies slavery,
it was their own work,” id. at 337.
158 Id. at 510.
159 Id. at 20.
160 Id. at 511.
161 Id. at 30.
162 Id. at 30–31 (stating that men do not yield their liberty unless by general consent, but
because all men seek good, they choose to be governed in order to gain society).
163 Id. at 25; see also id. at 49.
164 Consent for Sidney “is the ground of all just governments; for violence or fraud can
create no right; and the same consent gives the form to them all, how much soever they differ
from each other.” Id. at 30–31.
165 Id. at 130.
166 Id. at 99; see also id. at 521.
167 Id. at 49. The meaning of “publick good” is not entirely clear, but Sidney remarked:
“If the publick safety be provided, liberty and propriety secured, justice administered, virtue
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If government fails to honor its ends and mind its limits, those responsible, Sidney
warned, “may be restrained or chastised.”168  More radically, he counseled that “[i]f
the multitude . . . do institute [government], the multitude may abrogate; and they them-
selves, or those who succeed in the same right, can only be the fit judges of the perfor-
mance of the ends of the institution.”169  And God, having given liberty to all, would
approve of those who fight tyranny.  “If the laws of God and men are therefore of no
effect,” and “when the magistracy is left at liberty to break them,” Sidney declared,
“sedition[s], tumults, and war[s]. . . are justified by the laws of God and man.”170 
(Sidney mischievously added that a prince who abused the people would be, in effect,
rebelling against God, for God would never wish for people to live under tyranny.)171
Sidney’s turn to Christianity required him to negotiate the barbed briar that was
Paul’s epistle to the Romans, a text eagerly enlisted by Filmer and King James to
justify the divine right of kings:172
1Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers.  For there is
no power but of God:  the powers that be are ordained of God.
2Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance
of God:  and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.
3For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil.  Wilt
thou then not be afraid of the power?  do that which is good, and
thou shalt have praise of the same:
4For he is the minister of God to thee for good.  But if thou do that
which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain:  for
he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him
that doeth evil.173
Paul had indirectly called Emperor Nero the “minister of God,”174 or so James claimed,
even though Nero was a “bloody tyrant, an infamie to his aage, and a monster to the
encouraged, vice suppressed, and the true interest of the nation advanced, the ends of govern-
ment are accomplished . . . .” Id. at 444.
168 Id. at 21.
169 Id. When the government threatens the people’s liberty, there may exist “just grounds”
for rebellion and “it may be neither a crime nor infamy to do it.” Id. at 520.
170 Id. at 220.
171 See id. at 522.
172 FIGGIS, supra note 111, at 18–19 (arguing “that Kings and all in authority were vicars
of God” and that Christianity strengthened “the notion that obedience was a divine command”).
173 Romans 13:1–4.
174 KING JAMES I, A MEDITATION UPON THE 27, 28, 29 VERSES OF THE XXVII CHAPTER
OF SAINT MATTHEW. OR, A PATERNE FOR A KINGS INAUGURATION, in KING JAMES VI AND
I, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 94, at 241.
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world, being also an idolatrous persecutor.”175  James exclaimed that Paul implored
people to “obey and serve for conscience sake” even such a monster.176  Filmer
nodded in agreement:  “Saint Peter and Saint Paul, the two chief of the apostles, writ
their epistles at such time” when Emperor Nero terrorized the people.177  Still, Paul
directed the people to obey their monarch, Filmer noted with satisfaction.178
An irritated Sidney demanded, “[b]ut what if there be no monarch in the place?”179 
“Had the Apostle spoken in vain,” Sidney asked, “if the liberty of the Romans had not
been overthrown by the fraud and violence of Caesar?”180  Or, suppose, “God [had]
no minister amongst them till law and justice was overthrown, the best part of the
people destroy’d by the fury of a corrupt mercenary soldiery, and the world subdued
under the tyranny of the worst monsters that it had ever produced?”181  Under such
calamity, would God “patronize no governors or governments but such as these?”182 
Sidney indignantly posed:  “Does God uphold evil, and that only?”183
Paul was not an apologist for the divine right of kings, Sidney argued; the former
endorsed resistance to tyrants.  Read, Sidney began, these words from Paul:  “Rulers . . .
are not terror to good works, but to the evil:  Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? 
do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same; for he is the minister of
God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil.”184  For Sidney, the passage
meant that “[h]e therefore is only the minister of God, who is not a terror to good
works, but to evil; who executes wrath upon those that do evil, and is a praise to those
that do well.”185  And “he who doth well, ought not be afraid of the power, for he shall
receive praise.”186  It was thus absurd that “Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, Nero, and
the rabble of succeeding monsters, were a praise to those who did well, and a terror
to those who did ill.”187
This excursion into Paul’s epistle might seem a pedantic digression from the
central topic of American popular sovereignty, but the meaning of Paul’s epistle will
assume, as I show in Part V, political significance in the efforts by American clergy
to come to terms with the right to alter or abolish government.
175 KING JAMES I, supra note 97, at 71–72.
176 Id. at 71.
177 FILMER, supra note 133, at 240.
178 See id. (explaining how both Saint Peter and Saint Paul did not take notice of popular
government, but instead supported the king).
179 Id.
180 SIDNEY, supra note 146, at 370.
181 Id. at 370–71.
182 Id. at 371.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 371–72 (quoting Romans 13:3–4).
185 Id. at 372.
186 Id.
187 Id.
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B. Locke:  God, Not the King, Owns Us
For the great John Locke, Filmer’s chief failing was his morally serene endorse-
ment of slavery.  Accepting wholesale the axiom that kings had absolute right, Filmer,
charged Locke, permitted kings to be indifferent to “the Laws by which they are
constituted, and are to govern, and the Conditions under which they enter upon their
Authority.”188  Locke feared that such power would reduce “all Subjects to the utmost
Misery of Tyranny and Oppression,” and the king would never be required to seek the
people’s consent.189
Locke’s criticism of slavery had religious origins.  We could not submit our-
selves to slavery, Locke explained, because we were “all the Workmanship of one
Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker; . . . they are his Property, . . . made to last
during his, not one anothers Pleasure.”190  The argument that we were owned by God
challenged the king’s claim of absolute power.  “For a Man, not having the Power of
his own Life, cannot, by Compact, or his own Consent, enslave himself to any one,
nor put himself under the Absolute, Arbitrary Power of another, to take away his
Life, when he pleases.”191 Adam and his mythic heirs, then, could not possess absolute
right, for none could “give Life to that which has yet no being” or “frame and make
a living Creature, fashion the parts, and mould and suit them to their uses, and having
proportion’d and fitted them together, . . . put into them a living Soul.”192  To Locke,
Filmer’s story of Adam and his heirs was bogus.
Locke supplemented his campaign to discredit absolute monarchy by introducing
a conceptual prop called the “state of nature.”193  The state of nature was the natural
condition of man without government.194  Trying to position himself as a sober em-
piricist against Filmer’s fairy tale narrator, Locke dispassionately observed that the
state of nature was evidenced by native peoples in Peru and America.195  Anthropolog-
ically shallow by our standards, Locke’s point was that the world did not begin with
the anointed Adam, but with men in a state of nature who were born into “a State of
perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons
as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or
depending upon the Will of any other Man.”196  While a state of liberty, it was not
188 LOCKE, supra note 2, at 142.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 271.
191 Id. at 284 (emphasis omitted). By “men,” Locke apparently meant women as well, at
least for some purposes: “The Power of the Husband being so far from that of an absolute
Monarch, that the Wife has, in many cases, a Liberty to separate from him; where natural Right,
or their Contract allows it. . . .” Id. at 321 (emphasis omitted).
192 Id. at 179.
193 Id. at 269.
194 See id.
195 See id. at 277.
196 Id. at 269 (emphasis omitted).
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a state of license.197  Men were expected in the state of nature to comport themselves
with a “Law of Nature.”198  “Reason” was itself “that law” and “teaches all Mankind,
who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm
another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”199  Lest the references to reason
and fairness appear to flow from some crypto humanism, Locke directly acknowl-
edged God as the origin:  One who violated the law of nature “declares himself to live
by another Rule, than that of reason and common Equity, which is that measure God
has set to the actions of Men, for their mutual security.”200  Observe how “reason,” as
Locke defined it, was incompatible in two respects with Filmer’s patriarchalism.  First,
reason, properly used, admitted the ethical principle that all men were naturally “equal
and independent,” not the king’s lackeys.201  Second, Locke’s conception of reason
presumed that men possessed the mental faculty to discover moral truths in the law
of nature.202
Upon discovering these moral truths, men in the state of nature had the right to
enforce them.203  This led to intractable problems, however.  “For though the Law
of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational Creatures,” Locke explained, “yet
Men being biassed by their Interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not
apt to allow of it as a Law binding to them in the application of it to their particular
Cases.”204  And “[m]en being partial to themselves,” they will often resort to “[p]assion
and Revenge.”205  Wanting in the state of nature, then, was “a known and indifferent
Judge” to determine conflicts according to the law of nature.206
Men thus consented with each other to create a community—a “civil society,” as
Locke called it207—and then to erect a government therein.  The admission price for
civil society was that people surrender their rights to enforce the law of nature and
heed instead the laws created by government.208  People do not, however, completely
surrender their right to enforce the law of nature.  Namely, the people may “remove
or alter the Legislative, when they find the Legislative act contrary to the trust reposed
in them.”209  For the government held a “Fiduciary Power to act for certain ends”210
and the government was not permitted to “destroy the Property of the People, or to
197 Id. at 270–71.
198 Id. at 271.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 272 (first emphasis omitted; second emphasis added).
201 See id. at 271.
202 See id. at 271–72.
203 Id. at 271, 352.
204 Id. at 351.
205 Id.
206 Id. (emphasis omitted).
207 Id. at 324.
208 Id. at 352.
209 Id. at 367 (second emphasis omitted).
210 Id.
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reduce them to Slavery under Arbitrary Power.”211  This was not to suggest that
“Revolutions happen . . . upon every little mismanagement in publick affairs,”212
but only if there was “a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices.”213  Locke
also distinguished revolutions from rebellions, the latter being “an Opposition, not
to Persons, but Authority, which is founded only in the Constitutions and Laws of
the Government.”214
This rhetoric of revolution and its attendant reliance on religion would be em-
ployed in the service of the American Revolution, as I show in Parts V and VI.  Both
Locke and Sidney sought to limit absolute monarchy in the late seventeenth century;
writing nearly one hundred years prior to the American revolution, neither wrote to
inspire the aggrieved colonists living in the forlorn wilds of America.  Nonetheless, the
Americans, in their own hour of political need, found guidance from Locke and Sidney
in shaping arguments about the right of peoples to alter or abolish government.215
IV. STRUGGLING AUTHORITIES IN AMERICA
If religion is to serve as a resource to help people conceive a right to alter or
abolish government, the people must occupy a partial autonomy from governmental
coercion where they may make meaningful choices and engage in thoughtful reflection
about religion.216  Should that conclusion seem unwarranted, imagine a government
that controlled every aspect of the people’s religious expression and had inculcated in
every person the belief that the governmental rulers were gods to whom was due con-
summate obedience.  Under these circumstances—none too alien for those in nations
like North Korea—religion, far from being the balm of revolution, would be the cement
of totalitarianism.  The right to alter or abolish government, therefore, could have found
religious roots only in circumstances where the people exercised some meaningful
autonomy from the government.
So it is ironic that America’s colonial history would begin with regimes that used
religion (or were used by religion) to enforce norms of strict deference.  Consider the
two most important English colonies in the early seventeenth century:  Virginia and
Massachusetts.  Virginia was founded by a company chartered by King James I and
211 Id. at 412 (emphasis omitted).
212 Id. at 415 (emphasis omitted).
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Indeed, Locke and Sidney are easily among the two most influential thinkers for the
colonists. See MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW REPUBLICANISM 20
(1994) (“Sidney’s and Cato’s are the only political works that appear in the [colonial] libraries
with anywhere near the frequency of Locke’s books.”); see also supra note 144 and accom-
panying text.
216 See Mark E. Brandon, Family at the Birth of American Constitutional Order, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 1195, 1227–28 (1999).
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its official established church was Anglicanism.217  In 1611, Virginia had a law that
disciplined with fines, jail, and whippings employees who failed to attend Anglican
church services or catechism.218  Constant absences at Sabbath were to be punished
with death.219  Likewise, in 1641 a Massachusetts law grimly warned:  “If any man
after legall conviction shall have or worship any other god, but the lord god, he shall
be put to death.”220  And, another law threatened, “If any person shall Blaspheme the
name of god, . . . he shall be put to death.”221
Despite these formal restrictions, the colonists were already gratifying themselves
with a morally ambiguous independence.  Control by religious officials proved difficult
in a Virginia where, in 1662, just ten ministers catered to forty-five parishes separated
by long distances across rough terrain.222  Plus, Virginians had other things on their
minds besides religion.  They had to fight the Indians; as farmers, they had to subdue
a harsh wilderness; and, not least, by 1620, for those in Jamestown (America’s first
boomtown) there were quick fortunes to be made by hoarding and selling goods, in-
cluding “liquor and luxuries.”223  On top of this, in Virginia, “[d]runkenness, gambling,
brawling, and abuse of servants were so common that the government was almost help-
less to stop them.”224  Making things worse, women were only a quarter of the popu-
lation, and thus families, and the stabilizing forces which they engender, were slow
to develop.225  Not least, to the crimson chagrin of an Anglican Virginia, there roamed
within the colony an undaunted troupe of Puritans, Quakers, and Catholics who, in
defiance of Virginia’s laws, sought out converts.226
Like Virginia, Massachusetts had an established church, Puritanism, that was
supported by the state.227  But also like Virginia, Massachusetts had problems with
sowing obedience to religious authority.  For the first nine years, Plymouth Colony
lacked an ordained minister, leaving Sabbath duties to a lay elder.228  Even by 1630,
Massachusetts Bay had only five ministers, a distressingly inadequate number to
serve the expanding population.229  This vacuum left Massachusetts vulnerable to
217 FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA
46 (2003).
218 BONOMI, supra note 1, at 16.
219 Id.
220 THE BODY OF LIBERTIES OF THE MASSACHUSETS COLLONIE IN NEW ENGLAND (1641),
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 46, 47 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
221 Id.
222 BONOMI, supra note 1, at 16–17.
223 LAMBERT, supra note 217, at 53; see also BONOMI, supra note 1, at 16–17.
224 BONOMI, supra note 1, at 16.
225 Id.
226 LAMBERT, supra note 217, at 68–69.
227 See BONOMI, supra note 1, at 18.
228 See id.
229 Id.
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proselytizing by Familists, Antinomians, Anabaptists, and other critics of Puritanism,
as well as maverick Puritans like Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson whose growing
followers worried church leaders to no end.230  As the Harvard historian Samuel Eliot
Morison observed of Massachusetts, “‘[e]arnest fanatics [were] everywhere.’”231  In a
telling incident, Henry Dunster, then Harvard’s president, challenged church authority
in 1654 when he publicly refused to present his newborn for Puritan baptism.232
The Puritans themselves limited the reach of their church.  In England, the king
was the head of the Church of England and discriminated against competing faiths
like Puritanism.233  So it was sensible that in America the Puritans saw advantages to
separating church and state.234  This did not mean that the clergy was irrelevant, of
course.  The Puritan clergy influenced the laity in choosing leaders and it advised
government and interpreted the scriptural aspects of Massachusetts Bay’s laws.235 
Unlike England, however, in Massachusetts, “[t]he right to vote and hold office was
not revoked by loss of church membership.”236  The Puritan clergy could not remove
government officials if they strayed from their faith.  Governor John Winthrop of
Massachusetts discerned:  “non-membership [in church] may be a just cause of non-
admission to the place of magistracy, but yet ejection out of his [church] membership
will not be a just cause of ejecting him out of his magistracy.”237  Blasphemers and
heretics could be punished in Massachusetts, but only by civil officials and mostly
because religious outsiders were noisy threats to civil order rather than a disgrace to
a Puritan god.238
The examples of Massachusetts and Virginia suggest that the colonists in those
states enjoyed spaces of partial autonomy where government and its official religion
could not exert total control.  In these spaces, people could fashion their own beliefs,
including in a manner that justified the right of resistance against government.  Such
partially autonomous spaces were available in other colonies.  Pennsylvania’s Quakers
welcomed religious differences in what its leader William Penn called a “Holy Experi-
ment.”239  All Christians were permitted to become citizens and run for office; this in-
cluded Roman Catholics, a bold decision at the time.240  Rhode Island began as a
chaotic collection of religious fanatics and misfits whom no other colony wanted.241 
230 See id. at 18–19.
231 Id. at 19.
232 See id.
233 See LAMBERT, supra note 217, at 36, 82–83.
234 See id. at 82.
235 See id. at 83.
236 Id.
237 Letter from John Winthrop to Lord Saye and Sele, in THE PURITAN TRADITION IN
AMERICA, 1620–1730, at 147, 149 (Alden T. Vaughan ed., 1997).
238 LAMBERT, supra note 217, at 84.
239 Id. at 102.
240 Id. at 100–01; see also BONOMI, supra note 1, at 35.
241 See BONOMI, supra note 1, at 19–21, 34.
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In a short time, Roger Williams, the colony’s leader, would come to justify the diversity
as a matter of principle.242  Elsewhere, the minority English Catholics who held propri-
etorship of Maryland had no desire to provoke the state’s Protestant majority.243  The
Catholics thus refrained from establishing a formal church and instead afforded lim-
ited tolerance.244  Carolina, while an Anglican colony, welcomed Baptists, Huguenots,
Quakers, Presbyterians, and even Jews, who could help defend it against the bordering
French and Spanish settlements.245  Of the 4000 white settlers in southern Carolina in
1700, “some 500 were Huguenots, 1300 Presbyterians, 400 Baptists, and 100 Quakers,
while another 1700 adhered to the mother Church of England.”246  Up north, New
York was colonized by the Dutch West India Company.  Peter Stuyvesant, the col-
ony’s anti-Semitic director-general,247 once asked the board to halt the immigration
of Jews as a threat to morality.248  Scarcely less prejudiced than Stuyvesant, the board
of directors rejected the request, citing, among other reasons, the many shares owned
by Dutch Jews.249
If state-supported churches in America never enjoyed anything like complete
control in the seventeenth century, conditions in the mid-eighteenth century did not
improve their chances.  For the latter was marked by social forces that eroded estab-
lished authorities.  America’s population had doubled and then redoubled since 1700
and people left towns for the frontier where qualified ministers were few and the
reach of government tenuous.250  From across the Atlantic, “[t]ens of thousands of
immigrants arrived, many—such as Ulster Presbyterians from Northern Ireland and
Pietists from Germany—bringing notions that challenged religious establishments and
adding more sects to an already pluralistic society.”251  Then there was the dramatic
uprising in the 1740s by a younger generation of fiery preachers across different sects
who openly threatened the orthodoxy of the older priests in a movement that historians
a century later would call the Great Awakening.252  As historian Alice Baldwin ob-
served, “The Great Awakening with its consequent confusions, political strife, and
doctrinal discussions had stimulated men to new and lively thinking in religious and
civil affairs.”253  Meanwhile, the Enlightenment philosophies of Locke and Sidney
invited the learned to question governmental authority and, by the mid-eighteenth
242 See id. at 21, 34.
243 See id. at 21.
244 See id.
245 See id. at 32.
246 Id.
247 LAMBERT, supra note 217, at 133.
248 BONOMI, supra note 1, at 25.
249 Id.
250 See LAMBERT, supra note 217, at 123.
251 Id. at 123–24.
252 See BONOMI, supra note 1, at 133; see also BUTLER, supra note 14, at 164–65.
253 ALICE M. BALDWIN, THE NEW ENGLAND CLERGY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
80 (1958).
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century, their arguments “soon became standard texts at Harvard, Yale, and William
and Mary.”254  All of these disparate and sometimes coalescing phenomena under-
mined authority and impressed upon people the possibilities for individual choice
in matters of religion and politics.
V. GOD OPPOSED THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS
Filmer and King James had commended Paul’s epistle as divine benediction for
absolute rule by even “monsters” like Nero.255  Scorning this interpretation, Sidney
urged the reader to focus on Paul’s injunction that the king should work for the public
good as a “minister of God”256 and to behave as one who was “not a terror to good
works.”257  Sidney argued that when rulers acted to the contrary, Paul justified resis-
tance by the people.258  About seventy years after Sidney’s death, American clergy
elaborated this alternative reading.
Coiner of the phrase “No Taxation without Representation,” the Harvard-trained
Jonathan Mayhew was heir to a prominent line of Congregational ministers.259  Only
thirty years old when he penned it, his Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission,
was, according to the historian Bernard Bailyn, “the most famous sermon preached
in pre-Revolutionary America.”260  Not wanting to invite quibbles about misquota-
tion, Mayhew began the sermon by reciting all of Paul’s epistle in Romans 13:1–8.261 
Mayhew proceeded to explain why the epistle’s constituent parts justified people in
resisting and, if necessary, doing away with unjust rulers.262  But first, there was the
business of clarifying those pesky lines adored by Filmer and James.  Paul had ordered,
“Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers.  For there is no power but of God: 
the powers that be are ordained of God.”263  Mayhew explained that this passage was
intended for those “professed Christians [who] vainly imagine that they are wholly
excused from all manner of duty and subjection to civil authority.”264  Paul had also
announced, “[w]hosoever therefore resisteth the [government’s] power, resisteth the
254 LAMBERT, supra note 217, at 124.
255 See, e.g., SIDNEY, supra note 146, at 372.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 371–72 (emphasis omitted).
258 See id.
259 Bernard Bailyn, Introduction to JONATHAN MAYHEW, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING
UNLIMITED SUBMISSION AND NONRESISTANCE TO THE HIGHER POWERS (1750), reprinted in
1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1750–1776, at 204 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965).
260 Id.
261 JONATHAN MAYHEW, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING UNLIMITED SUBMISSION AND
NONRESISTANCE TO THE HIGHER POWERS, reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, supra note 259, at 215.
262 Id.
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ordinance of God:  and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.”265 
Here, too, Mayhew argued that Paul had in mind “ye [who] factiously disobey and
resist the civil authority.”266
So Paul was not a zealot for unequivocal obedience, in Mayhew’s view.  Absur-
dity abounded therefore when James summoned Paul for the proposition that people
should counter the king’s misdeeds with only “sobbes and teares to God.”267  Suppose,
Mayhew jeered,
[i]f [rulers] turn tyrants . . . we must not pretend to right our-
selves unless it be by prayers and tears . . . and if these methods
fail of procuring redress we must not have recourse to any other,
but all suffer ourselves to be robbed and butchered at the pleasure
of the Lord’s anointed, lest we should incur the sin of rebellion
and the punishment of damnation.268
Paeans to “turn the other cheek” were, from a common sense perspective, never meant
to be taken literally, Mayhew argued.269  The maxim to obey had its exceptions, too. 
Obedience, explained Mayhew, was only due to “good rulers.”270  Called “God’s min-
isters” by Paul, “[r]ulers have no authority from God to do mischief.”271  Mayhew
argued that when magistrates “rob and ruin the public instead of being guardians of
its peace and welfare, they immediately cease to be the ordinance and ministers of God
and no more deserve that glorious character than common pirates and highwaymen.”272 
Such knaves are “not God’s ministers but Satan’s.”273
According to Mayhew, Paul believed that when a ruler “turns tyrant and makes
his subjects his prey to devour . . . we are bound to throw off our allegiance to him and
to resist.”274  By enjoining the king from doing evil, Paul “implicitly authorizes and
even requires us to make resistance whenever this shall be necessary to the public
safety and happiness.”275  A local analogy was in order.  “Suppose,” said Mayhew “[a]
parent at length runs distracted, and attempts, in his mad fit, to cut all his children’s
throats.”276  In this case, “is not the reason before assigned why these children should
obey their parent while he continued of a sound mind, namely, their common good,
265 Romans 13:2.
266 MAYHEW, supra note 261, at 218 (emphasis added).
267 KING JAMES I, supra note 97, at 72.
268 MAYHEW, supra note 261, at 222 (first emphasis added).
269 Id. at 223.
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273 Id. at 231 (emphasis omitted).
274 Id. at 232.
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a reason equally conclusive for disobeying and resisting him since he is become
delirious and attempts their ruin?”277
Mayhew was not the only one upset over attempts by Filmer and James to hijack
Paul’s message.  There was Charles Chauncy, a Harvard graduate and, in his time,
“the most influential clergyman in[] Boston.”278  Chauncy delivered an election ser-
mon in 1747 to the Massachusetts Governor, the King’s Council, and the state house
of representatives.279  Seasoned with quotes from Paul’s epistle, the sermon acknowl-
edged that rulers are “the ministers of God; and the powers that be are declared to
be ordained of God.”280  Nonetheless, Chauncy, paraphrasing Paul, insisted that rulers
“must be just in the use of their power; confining it within the limits prescribed in the
constitution they are under.”281  So, too, Chauncy spoke that “’[t]is the just exercise of
power that distinguishes right from might; authority that is to be revered and obeyed,
from violence and tyranny, which are to be dreaded and deprecated.”282  Just rulers also
had to be impartial:  “They should not, when upon the business of framing and pass-
ing acts, suffer themselves to be swayed by any wrong biass, either from self-will,
or self-interest . . . .”283  Scripture, Chauncy reminded, required such conduct.284  For
good measure, he announced that the power of tyrants “ought to be taken out of their
hands, that they might no longer be under advantages to injure their brethren of the
same community.”285
The itinerant Baptist preacher John Allen made similar arguments in a 1772
Boston sermon directed to the Earl of Dartmouth, Her Majesty’s secretary of state
277 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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for the colonies.286  Allen, like Locke and Sidney, eschewed Adam’s claim of king-
ship.287  In its stead, Allen commended an empathic equality.  “The law of God directs
us to do unto others,” he said, “as we would they should do unto us.”288  He continued:
As a fly, or a worm, by the law of nature has as great a right to
liberty, and freedom (according to their little sphere in life), as the
most potent monarch upon the earth:  And as there can be no
other difference between your Lordship, and myself, but what is
political, I therefore without any further apology, take leave to ask
your Lordship, whether any one that fears GOD, loves his neigh-
bour as himself (which is the true scripture-mark of a christian),
will oppress his fellow-creatures?289
By stipulating that God gave all equal rights, Allen then could insist that “the
people are the right and foundation of power and authority, the original seat of
majesty—the author of laws, and the creators of officers to execute them.”290  Accord-
ingly, “a king is the guardian and trustee of the rights and laws of the people, but a
tyrant destroys them.”291  Alluding to the king’s effort to tax the colonists, for example,
Allen announced that “[n]ature forbids it; the law of God condemns it.  And no law,
but that of tyranny, can desire it.”292  Allen also pruned examples from the Bible: 
“Was not David made a king for the people?  Was not Saul?  Was not Solomon? 
Then let not kings think too highly of themselves; for the GOD of heaven never intended
they should be any more than the servants of the people . . . .”293  Allen then briskly
turned to the king of England:  “[I]f the king of England is not happy let him thank
himself for it:  It is not his people’s fault—it is his own.  For that king is not worthy
to reign, that does not make the rights of his people the rule of his actions . . . .”294 
If a people wage war against a king who has destroyed their liberties, it “is no
rebellion.”295  If anything, such a king would “be a rebel to GOD.”296  Notice the
286 Ellis Sandoz, Introduction to JOHN ALLEN, AN ORATION UPON THE BEAUTIES OF LIBERTY
(Dec. 3, 1772), reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS, supra note 278, at 305.
287 Nathaniel Niles of Newburyport, Massachusetts also narrated a story of creation where
Adam makes no appearance: “Originally, there were no private interests. The world and all
things in it, were the common interests of all the inhabitants, under God the great owner.”
NATHANIEL NILES, TWO DISCOURSES ON LIBERTY, reprinted in 1 POLITICAL WRITING, supra
note 285, at 260–61.
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resemblance to Sidney’s argument, nearly a hundred years prior, that a tyrant was
one who rebelled against God’s command to respect the people’s liberty.297
Elsewhere, there circulated a popular pamphlet ungainly titled Defensive Arms
Vindicated and the Lawfulness of the American War Made Manifest.298  Dedicated
to “General Washington,” the anonymous author explained why God supported the
people’s right to wage war against tyrants.299  Tyrants, our author charged, were ser-
vants of the antichrist.300  And what of Paul’s epistle?  In words that would have
pleased Sidney, our author tells us that “[t]he apostle here was, no doubt, speaking
of lawful rulers, not tyrants.”301  As for Nero, that prickly darling of James and Filmer,
our author explained that Paul never referred explicitly to Nero and probably meant
for us to obey the Nero-hating Roman Senate.302  Then there were those Biblical
passages which instructed Christians to turn the other cheek.303  These, the author
explained, referred to “private revenge and retaliation,” not the “resisting of tyrants”
who “violently endanger[ed] our lives, laws, religion, and liberties.”304  For tyrants,
the people should embrace the proverb that “[h]e that killeth with the sword must
be killed with the sword.”305
Abraham Williams, the fiery Congregational minister, also discussed Saint Paul
in a sermon before the governor and the general court of Massachusetts.306  Paul,
Williams insisted, believed that “Magistrates are God’s Ministers, designed for Good
to the People.”307  For the “Voice of the people” is “the Voice of God.”308  Accord-
ingly, Paul intended for government “to secure Men from all Injustice, Violence and
Rapine.”309  In 1768, the lawyer Silas Downer spoke in Rhode Island of the “liberty
297 See SIDNEY, supra note 146, at 522–23.
298 DEFENSIVE ARMS VINDICATED AND THE LAWFULNESS OF THE AMERICAN WAR MADE
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which the GOD of nature hath given us.”310  For Downer, religion “vanished at the
deformed appearance of tyranny.”311  Compare this assessment with Filmer’s, almost
one hundred years prior:  “That there is no such form of government as a tyranny.”312 
Filmer would have stoked the ire of Congregationalist pastor Daniel Shute.  Shute’s
1768 election sermon observed that while rulers deserved respect, it was also true that
“[l]ike other men,” rulers were “exposed to temptations, and perhaps to more and
greater than others.”313  Therefore, Shute argued,
[t]he doctrine of passive obedience and non-resistance in the un-
limited sense it has been urged by some, came not down from
above, as it can be supported neither by reason nor revelation; and
therefore if any where, may be urged with a better grace by the
rulers of darkness, in the regions below.314
Likewise, Congregationalist minister Zabdiel Adams, cousin of John Adams, cried
that Paul would never have supposed that “we should obey the unrighteous and
oppressive commands of those in power, and that, not merely for wrath, but for
conscience sake.”315
Consider also Benjamin Colman, the Congregational pastor who had de-
clined Harvard’s presidency but served as a trustee.316  Sermonizing in 1730 before
Massachusetts’s governor, Colman discussed Paul’s epistle.317  At first, he nodded
toward Filmer and James.  “Let us know and keep our own place,” Colman read Paul
as saying, “and do our duty to those whom GOD sets over us.”318  This supplication
was flanked by a warning to rulers.  Colman quoted from Paul’s epistle:  “‘Let every
Soul be subject unto the higher Powers:  For there is no Power but of GOD . . . .’”319 
Colman, illustrating Paul’s message, pointed to the first colonial leaders’ “generous
regards to the publick” through which “GOD will have glory.”320  Leaders could not
310 SILAS DOWNER, A DISCOURSE AT THE DEDICATION OF THE TREE OF LIBERTY (1768),
reprinted in 1 POLITICAL WRITING, supra note 285, at 99.
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be trusted with their power and, by implication, the people with God’s blessing
would need to correct them when necessary.  “Take away the fear of GOD’S govern-
ment & judgment,” Coleman cautioned, “and humane rule utterly falls, or corrupts
into tyranny.”321
Like Coleman, Elisha Williams rejected the divine right of kings with its claim
to absolute rule.  In his 1744 pamphlet, Williams turned to the Gospel of Matthew: 
“‘Be not ye called Rabbi; For one is your master even CHRIST, and all ye are Brethren: 
And call no Man your Father upon Earth; for one is your Father which is in Heaven: 
Neither be ye called Masters; for one is your master even CHRIST.’”322  Williams
added that
[A]ll Christians are charg’d upon the duty and obedience they
owe to CHRIST, that they should none of them set themselves up
for authoritative masters, judges, or directors of men in religious
matters (as the Pharisees did); and likewise that they should not
submit to any who should set themselves up as such.323
Here was a principle of equality that would underwrite a tacit justification for the
people’s right to alter or abolish government.
The principle resonated in the 1774 sermon by Samuel Sherwood, nephew of
Aaron Burr, Sr., Princeton’s president.324  Titled A Sermon Containing Scriptural
Instructions to Civil Rulers, and All Free-born Subjects, Sherwood’s work was one
of the most famous in the Revolution.325  He made arguments analogous to those of
Locke and Sidney.  Like them, Sherwood believed that God was perfect while human
beings were inherently fallible.326  Accordingly, no ruler was “infallibly right in all
things, and cannot therefore be complied with in all instances, consistent with . . . the
superior obligations we are under to the sovereign Ruler of the world.”327  The “Ruler
of the world . . . still maintains this rightful authority over us and has not given it by
delegation, to any one among created beings.”328
Instead of feigning infallibility, rulers, Sherwood asserted, should emulate those
biblical kings who worked for the people.  King David, for example, “had no notion
of aggrandizing himself, and his nobility, by enslaving his subjects, and stripping
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them of their property, at his own arbitrary will and pleasure.”329  David was rather
“the faithful servant of God, and his generation” and he “consider[ed] himself as
appointed to serve [the people], whose rights and privileges were esteemed by him,
more sacred and inviolable than those of the royal scepter and diadem.”330  (Compare
this democratic rendering of David with Filmer’s gloss that David “was a king, and
therefore bound to no laws, because kings are free from the bonds of any fault.”)331
If rulers were not considered by the colonists to be divine and infallible, the
latter considered people in general to possess the reason that was necessary to make
meaningful decisions about their political future.  I discuss this next.
VI. THE PEOPLE POSSESS REASON
Echoing the arguments of Locke and Sidney, the American clergy, I will show,
argued that God had given people reason to discern moral principles and make mean-
ingful decisions about self-direction.  And because people were reasoning beings,
government had to rest on their consent; when government transgressed its authority,
the people were justified in their right to alter or abolish it.
The title of Nathanael Emmons’s 1778 sermon, The Dignity of Man, portended
its optimism regarding man’s capacity for reason.332  Where Filmer and King James
once proclaimed that men should submit themselves without question to the king,333
Emmons announced that “man hath a capacity for holiness as well as knowledge.”334 
Emmons argued that “[man’s] rational and moral faculties both capacitate and oblige
him to be holy.  His perception and volition, in connection with his reason and con-
science, enable him to discern and feel the right and wrong of actions, and the beauty
and deformity of characters.”335  Emmons believed that reason “renders [man] capable
of doing justly, loving mercy, and walking humbly with God.”336  And, “as he is
capable of growing in knowledge, so he is capable of growing in grace, in a constant
and endless progression.”337  King James, who had boasted a god-like infallibility,
would have condemned as irresponsible Emmons’s democratic assurance that all men
“bear the image of God, in point of rationality.”338
Congregational minister Elizur Goodrich similarly spoke that “[t]he great and
most universal principle and law of rational union and happiness, is the love of God
329 Id. at 383–84.
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and of our neighbour.”339  The “first maxim derived from it,” Goodrich continued,
“is that divine precept in the gospel, ‘whatsoever ye would that men should do unto
you, do ye also the same unto them.’”340  More than religious doctrine, “from these
principles must be derived the knowledge of all laws.”341  Elsewhere, Richard Price,
a Presbyterian minister and friend of Benjamin Franklin, rhapsodized:  “I see the
ardour for liberty catching and spreading; a general amendment beginning in human
affairs; the dominion of kings changed for the dominion of laws, and the dominion
of priests giving way to the dominion of reason and conscience.”342  The latter state-
ment was not intended, of course, to herald atheism.  It was a yearning by Reverend
Price for the end of the divine right of kings and the superstitions that nourished its
oppressiveness.  Price added with gratification, “I have lived to see a diffusion of
knowledge, which has undermined superstition . . . I have lived to see the rights of
men better understood than ever; and nations panting for liberty.”343
Israel Evans, Madison’s classmate at Princeton and a Presbyterian minister,
delivered an election sermon in 1791 where he announced:
Nor hath the all-wise Creator invested any order of men with the
right of judging for their fellow-creatures in the great concerns
of religion.  Truth and religion are subjects of determination
entrusted to all men; and it is a privilege of all men to judge and
determine for themselves.344
Evans added that “[s]lavery blots the image of the Creator, which was at first im-
pressed upon man:  it banishes knowledge, and courts misery,” but “men, enlightened,
pursue with ardour the knowledge and recovery of their rights.”345  By contrast, “[i]n
all the dark ages of the world, tyranny has been established upon the slavish igno-
rance of mankind.”346
The great Puritan Moses Mather believed that “[f]ree agency, or a rational exis-
tence, with its powers and faculties, and freedom of enjoying and exercising them,
is the gift of God to man.”347  For Mather, the right of meaningful reflection was
339 ELIZUR GOODRICH, THE PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL UNION AND HAPPINESS CONSIDERED AND
RECOMMENDED (May 10, 1787), reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS, supra note 278, at  915
(emphasis added).
340 Id. (quoting Matthew 7:12).
341 Id.
342 RICHARD PRICE, A DISCOURSE ON THE LOVE OF OUR COUNTRY (1790), reprinted in
POLITICAL SERMONS, supra note 278, at 1027.
343 Id.
344 ISRAEL EVANS, A SERMON DELIVERED AT THE ANNUAL ELECTION (1791), reprinted
in POLITICAL SERMONS, supra note 278, at 1063.
345 Id. at 1071.
346 Id.
347 MOSES MATHER, AMERICA’S APPEAL TO THE IMPARTIAL WORLD (1775), reprinted in
POLITICAL SERMONS, supra note 278, at 444.
320 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:281
something that could not be expunged by other than God:  “The right of the donor,
and the authenticity of the donation, are both incontestable; hence man hath an abso-
lute property in, and right of dominion over himself, his powers and faculties . . .
and uncontrolable by any but him, who created and gave them.”348  The theme of all
people as possessing reason was taken up in 1768 by Daniel Shute in his election
sermon to the Massachusetts Governor and House of Representatives:
The plan of the creator being thus manifestly adapted to promote
the happiness of his creation, his conduct herein becomes a pat-
tern to his creatures that are rational moral agents, and the rule
of their duty, according to their measure; for all moral obligation
on such, indubitably, arises from the will of God, as there is so
exact a coincidence between his will, and the relative fitness of
things; so that the nearer they resemble him, the nearer they will
come to the perfect standard of right action, and the nearer they
come to this the more happiness will be produced.349
Notice how Shute located rational moralism in all peoples whereas Filmer and James
had restricted God-like properties to the king.350
The Massachusetts physician John Perkins, who was not avowedly Christian,
reversed the order of inference by the clergy.  Writing in 1771, Perkins inferred that
God existed because man possessed reason:  “Is it possible to believe that an infi-
nitely wise and good Being, would have plac’d such a severe chastiser in our frame,
were we really necessitated; but rather that he would have form’d us so as not wrong-
fully and injuriously to afflict ourselves[?]”351  Perkins added, “[w]e should rather
believe that he would have impressed mankind with an effectual bias to right conduct,
or else with proper instincts for every laudable purpose.”352
348 Id. Chauncy, in a 1747 sermon, extolled that “the voice of reason is the voice of God.”
CHAUNCY, supra note 280, at 143. Elizur Goodrich also referenced reason in his justification
for resistance to tyranny:
When a constitutional government is converted into tyranny, . . . there
ought not to be the least doubt but that a remedy consistent with this
doctrine of the apostle, is provided in the laws of GOD and reason, for
their preservation; nor ought resistance in such case to be called rebel-
lion. But who will imagine, that GOD, whose first law, in the world of
nature and reason, is order and love, has commissioned men of a private
character . . . to inflame and raise the multitude. . . .
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Such encomiums to reason were more than scholastic.  As Locke and Sidney
had shown, they paved the way for a concept of political legitimacy rooted in the
consent of the governed.  Consider Pastor Samuel Sherwood.  He declared that God
“has made mankind rational creatures; and left them to choose that which they appre-
hend to be most perfect in its nature and kind, and best suited to their state, situation
and circumstances.”353  Observe how men being “rational” entitles them to a govern-
ment of their choosing.  Instead of anointing Adam, God, Sherwood insisted, made
all “free-agents” in a “state of nature” that was “previous to their uniting as members
of society.”354  In this state of nature, people enjoy “free choice to agree upon such a
form of government . . . as they judge most conducive to their happiness and good.”355 
As such, any one, as a matter of natural principle, “has no more claim than another
to be, jure divino, or of divine right . . . than its being more conformable to right rea-
son and equity, by the eternal rules of which, God has manifested it to be his will, that
his rational creatures be governed.”356  Once established, the governmental rulers were
prohibited from abusing their subjects.  “[W]hen persons have entered by consent
and free choice, into society,” Sherwood explained, “they must acknowledge them-
selves under strict and sacred obligations to act toward one another agreeable to the
laws and constitution of that society whereof they are members.”357
Puritan minister Elisha Williams had something similar in mind.  His thesis was
that because all people possessed God-given reason, they could justifiably alter or
abolish government.358  Like “the celebrated Lock[e],” Williams set out his arguments
by beginning with a state of nature, prior to government.359  In this natural condition,
“GOD,” Williams declared, had “given man an understanding to direct his actions”
and “has given him therewith a freedom of will and liberty of acting, as properly be-
longing thereto.”360  The God-given liberty, however, did not permit “every one to
do what he pleases without any regard to any law; for a rational creature cannot but
be made under a law from its Maker.”361  Instead, the liberty “consists in a freedom
from any superiour power on earth” as well as adhering to a “law of nature,” which
Williams also called a law of the “Maker.”362  This law of nature, if studied with
reason, yielded the precept that “all men are naturally equal in respect of jurisdiction
or dominion one over another.”363
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Men could not endure the state of nature, Williams explained, because many would
either ignore the law of nature or fail to study it.364  Passion and revenge would ensue
and property and person would be imperiled.365  The problem, at bottom, was the
want of “known and indifferent judge[s] with authority to determine all differences
according to the established law.”366  To remedy this problem, Williams announced
that “reason teaches men to join in society, to unite together into a commonwealth.”367 
Upon entering the commonwealth, Williams, following Locke, explained that everyone
surrendered his right to do whatever he thinks proper to enforce the law of nature.368 
Each person also relinquished his right to punish others.369  However, Williams stressed
that “no more natural liberty or power is given up than is necessary for the preservation
of person and property.”370  Further, the laws of the commonwealth must adhere to
the law of nature and must derive from the people’s consent.371  Williams concluded,
“[h]ence then the fountain and original of all civil power is from the people, and is cer-
tainly instituted for their sakes.”372  This statement presaged Madison’s Federalist 49
which states that “the people are the only legitimate fountain of power” and that “it
is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of
government hold their power, is derived.”373  Notice, too, how Williams’s statement
inverted Filmer’s belief that the “subjection of children [and subjects] is the only foun-
tain of all regal authority, by the ordination of God himself.”374  Lest his religiosity
seem quiescent, Williams stressed:  “There are too too many arbitrary governments
in the world, where the people don’t make their own laws.  These are not properly
speaking governments but tyrannies; and are absolutely against the law of GOD . . . .”375 
Under this definition, Filmer’s monarchy would be a tyranny in defiance of God.
Related arguments were delivered by Samuel West when he gave his 1776 sermon
before the Massachusetts Council and state house of representatives.376  Drawing
amply from “Mr. Locke,”377 he explained that men were given “right reason”378—
which is also the “voice of God”379—such that they generally could determine the
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“law of nature.”380  The law of nature prohibited that which is “immoral, or contrary
to the will of God, and injurious to their fellow-creatures.”381  Government becomes
necessary because “[m]en of unbridled lusts” ignore the law of nature and “strong
propensities of our animal nature often overcome the sober dictates of reason.”382 
Without government, people cannot enjoy “all those liberties and privileges which
the Deity has bestowed upon [them]” which are “consistent with the public good.”383 
The purpose of government, therefore, was to preserve liberty, not to subdue it.384 
Against an oppressive government, the people could justifiably “renounce all sub-
mission.”385  For “no rational man” entered government to be oppressed.386  True,
the public can misunderstand the facts but, unlike a given individual, “the public is
always willing to be rightly informed, and when it has proper matter of conviction laid
before it its judgment is always right.”387
Philips Payson took a somewhat different turn.  Rather than elaborate the primacy
of reason, he argued for the development of knowledge.388  As a scientist as well as
a Congregational minister, Payson felt that the accumulation of knowledge was nec-
essary for self-government and approved by God.389  “The voice of reason and the
voice of God,” he wrote, “both teach us that the great object or end of government
is the public good.”390  And “righteous government originates from the people, and
is under their direction and control.”391  To make meaningful decisions about their
government, Payson explained, people had to be free from “ignorance.”392  Accord-
ingly, government should seek to promote “[e]very kind of useful knowledge.”393 
As such, “[a] republican government and science mutually promote and support
each other.”394
CONCLUSION
This Article has traversed two continents and nearly two centuries.  It began with
copious examples of the American people asserting in the Declaration of Independence,
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388 See PHILIPS PAYSON, A SERMON (1778), reprinted in 1 POLITICAL WRITING, supra note
285, at 526–27.
389 See id. at 527–30.
390 Id. at 524.
391 Id.
392 Id. at 526.
393 Id. at 527 (emphasis added).
394 Id. at 526.
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as well as their state and Federal constitutions, the right to alter or abolish government. 
Without discounting the secular origins of the right, I suggested that a religious one
was also available.  I looked to the early seventeenth century pronouncements of King
James I and, later, Sir Robert Filmer.  Both insisted that God had anointed kings to
rule with absolute sovereignty; Saint Paul was eagerly enlisted by both men as biblical
authority.  Locke and Sidney, writing in the latter seventeenth century, argued that
nothing in Saint Paul’s epistle supported such a conclusion.  If anything, Saint Paul,
they argued, had implored rulers to dedicate themselves to the people’s happiness,
and that the people had a right from God, even a duty to Him, to overthrow despots. 
Rulers, Locke and Sidney explained, should not coerce their subjects into accepting
some contrived account of the divine right of kings.  Locke and Sidney argued that
God had given all people the reason necessary for meaningful self-direction, includ-
ing for matters political.  These two arguments were echoed by prominent American
clergymen in the eighteenth century who sought out religious justifications for their
country’s revolution.
After the Revolution, the Constitutional Convention did not produce a document
that contained any references to God or a “religious” right to alter or abolish govern-
ment.  But the Constitution, as amended, contained provisions that protected condi-
tions for the faithful to contemplate and give meaning to that right.  Consider the
religion clauses of the First Amendment:  “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”395  Together
and alone, the clauses have been interpreted by the Supreme Court to protect spaces
for people to be faithful to their religions.396  The Establishment Clause prohibits the
395 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
396 Professor Laurence Tribe writes:
Allocating religious choices to the unfettered consciences of individuals
under the free exercise clause remains, in part, a means of assuring that
church and state do not unite to create the many dangers and divisions
often implicit in such an established union. Similarly, forbidding the
excessive identification of church and state through the establishment
clause remains, in part, a means of assuring that government does not
excessively intrude upon religious liberty. Thus, the Supreme Court has
frequently recognized that “the two clauses may overlap.”
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1156–57 (2d. ed. 1988) (internal
citations omitted) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963)); see also DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 128–33,
141–49 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the religion clauses re-
flects a Western tradition of protecting the right of conscience); Arlin M. Adams & Charles
J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1643 (1989) (“The
core value of the religion clauses is liberty of conscience in religious matters, an ideal which
recurs throughout American history from the colonial period of Roger Williams to the early
national period of the Founders.”); Rodney K. Smith & Patrick A. Shea, Religion and the
Press: Keeping First Amendment Values in Balance, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 177, 202 (“The
Establishment Clause limitation protects against a particular religion or group of religions
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government from coercing people to adopt a given religion (or religion generally),397
and the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from punishing people for
being faithful to their own religions.398  Notice how the two religion clauses in the
commandeering the state in a manner that infringes on the liberty of conscience of others,” and
the “free exercise limitation, in turn, protects the right to act upon one’s religious conscience
unless, in the words of James Madison, ‘the preservation of equal liberty, and the existence
of the State be manifestly endangered.’”).
397 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Justice Black, for the
Court, wrote:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government . . . can force nor influence
a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance.
Id. at 15–16. Justice Kennedy, for the Court, in Lee v. Weisman added: “It is beyond dispute
that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which ‘establishes
a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’” 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). Invoking a different rationale, Justice O’Connor
explained in a concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly that
[g]overnment can run afoul of that prohibition [in the Establishment
Clause] in two principal ways. One is excessive entanglement with
religious institutions, which may interfere with the independence of the
institutions, give the institutions access to government or governmental
powers not fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, and foster the
creation of political constituencies defined along religious lines. The
second and more direct infringement is government endorsement or dis-
approval of religion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored mem-
bers of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.
465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
398 See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 597 (rejecting a state-sanctioned religious exercise “in which
the student was left with no alternative but to submit”); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human
Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“The free exercise of religion means, first and
foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”), superseded
by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488;
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–53 (1985) (“[T]he Court has unambiguously concluded
that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right
to select any religious faith or none at all.”); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981) (“Where the state . . . denies [an important] benefit
because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.”);
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“Freedom of thought, which includes freedom
of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the right to maintain theories
of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox
faiths.”) (citation omitted).
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Federal Constitution correspond nicely with the arguments by Locke and Sidney and
their American progeny.  Locke and Sidney had argued that God had never given the
king a divine right of absolute dominion.  They had argued, in other words, that the
king lacked the authority to coerce his subjects to accept his religious mandate, an
objection that anticipates the Establishment Clause.  Locke and Sidney had also argued
that God had given to all peoples the reason necessary for meaningful self-direction,
including in political matters.  The Free Exercise Clause likewise insists that people
be left alone to discover religious truths, including truths pertaining to politics, for
themselves.  In this way, Americans were guaranteed a right to reflect on politics in a
manner whereby they could, in unusually arduous circumstances, appeal to heaven.
